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Introduction 
The condition of the public capital stock- 
perceived by many to be dilapidated and 
inadequate-has received considerable attention 
in political, media, and academic circles in 
recent years. 
Pat Choate and Susan Walter's America in 
Ruins gave striking examples of crumbling infra- 
structure and suggested that enormous increases 
in infrastructure investment were needed just to 
maintain the existing levels of services. The media 
and political attention given this work was high- 
lighted by tragedies such as the 1983 collapse of 
the Interstate 95 bridge in Connecticut. More sys- 
tematic studies by the Urban Institute and the 
Congressional Budget Ofice (1983) catalogued 
the existing state of public infrastructure and pro- 
jected the need for new public investment.' 
More recently, the National Council of Public 
Works Improvement (1988) completed a series 
of studies examining the state of the nation's 
public infrastructure, entitled Fragile Founda- 
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tions and concluded that "...the quality of Ameri- 
ca's infrastructure is barely adequate to fulfill 
current requirements, and ins
uffi
cient to meet 
the demand of  future economic growth and 
development."* 
Debates and studies of the infrastructure "cri- 
sis" involve a wide range of policy issues related 
to measuring the costs and benefits of public 
capital. The issue of  what level of infrastructure 
is optimal involves addressing questions of how 
to measure the current state of and future needs 
for public capital, how to measure the impact of 
infrastructure on productivity and regional 
growth, and how expenditures on public capital 
should be weighed against other uses of public 
monies. Questions of financing involve tradi- 
tional issues of fiscal federalism and public 
finance, including what level of government 
should provide infrastructure services, who 
should pay, and what financing mechanisms 
raise revenue with the least economic cost. 
While most studies argue that increased public 
investment is needed, a more provocative set of 
1  The Urban Institute project included a series of case studies on munici- 
pal infrastructure. For example, see Humphrey et al. (1979). For  a review of 
infrastructure needs studies, see Peterson et al.  (1986).  2  National Council of  Public Works Improvement (1988), p.  1. 
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arrived at its present condition and critiques the 
decision-making process itself. In particular, it is 
alleged that the structure of infrastructure financ- 
ing mechanisms, combined with political and 
budgetary pressures, induce public officials to 
systematically underfund the maintenance of the 
existing capital stock, leading to excessive dete- 
rioration of public infrastructure. The study of 
infrastructure maintenance, however, has received 
little empirical attention due to the lack of data 
on local maintenance policies and a lack of natu- 
ral experiments with which to evaluate public- 
sector maintenance. 
This article reviews questions regarding infra- 
structure policy with a focus on how the costs and 
benefits of public capital and maintenance deci- 
sions are potentially distorted by budget proce- 
dures, political pressures, and the structure of 
federal grant policies. I then describe how the 
local mass-transit industry provides an opportu- 
nity to investigate public-sector investment and 
maintenance decisions. Empirical evidence from 
two recent studies of the local mass-transit indus- 
try, Cromwell(1988a, 1988b), is then summar- 
ized. The results suggest the structure of federal 
grant policies has important effects on infrastruc- 
ture decisions of state and local governments. 
I.  Infrastructure 
Policy Incentives 
Budget  Processes 
Leonard (1986) argues that ignoring deprecia- 
tion and deferring maintenance are both power- 
ful forms of hidden spending that are not 
accounted for by local governments. Failure to 
reinvest or maintain existing infrastructure is, in 
effect, to live off an inherited bank account. Cur- 
rent taxpayers spend assets provided to them by 
previous generations. This spending is obscured, 
however, by the lack of records and comprehen- 
sive accounting for fixed-asset investments from 
year to year. 
Current accounting procedures for capital and 
maintenance by local governments appear to be 
inadequate for effective management of public 
infrastructure.3 The Government Accounting 
Standards Board, which sets standards for public- 
sector accounting, requires governments to 
3  These arguments were first advanced by Leonard (1986) and are also 
presented in  Blumenfeld (1986) and the National Council of  Public Woks 
Improvement (19881, 
maintain records of fixed assets recorded at his- 
torical cost in a separate account group held 
apart from operating funds. Recording the value 
of immovable infrastructure assets-bridges, 
roads, sewers-is explicitly optional, as is the 
recording of depreciation. Even if a governmen- 
tal unit does recognize depreciation, it is shown 
as an offset to the value of assets, not as an oper- 
ating cost as in the private sector. When tight 
funds result in deferred maintenance, there is no 
notation in capital records of the decline in asset 
values from the failure to maintain them, making 
preventive and routine maintenance an attractive 
target for budget cuts. 
In a 1983 survey of city and county officials by 
the American Planning Association, 29 percent 
reported having poor information on the current 
conditions of the city's or county's capital stock 
and 48 percent felt they had weak methods of 
evaluating the cost-effectiveness of proposed 
projects. Hatry et al. (1984, 1986) surveyed over 
40 public works agencies and found capital 
investment decisions to be highly decentralized. 
In general, agency management determined 
what analysis should be undertaken and deter- 
mined priorities. While most agencies had for- 
mal procedures for rating and ranking potential 
projects, these rankings were oflen based prima- 
rily on subjective information. They found few 
explicit estimates of expected improvement in 
service levels or expected reductions in future 
costs from individual proposed projects. 
Budgeting procedures for maintenance were 
found to be even more deficient. The agencies 
surveyed undertook only a small amount of reg- 
ular, systematic examination of capital mainte- 
nance and repair options and did not regularly 
and systematically examine trade-offs between 
preventive maintenance activity (such as painting 
bridges or cleaning sewers) and other major 
options, such as rehabilitation or reconstruction. 
The Hatry study found no examples in which a 
local government considered the costs of 
deferred maintenance. 
Several proposals for maintenance evaluation 
procedures have surfaced in recent years for sev- 
eral common forms of public infrastructure. For 
example, Archuleta (1986) proposed a program 
for effective preventive maintenance for water 
and wastewater facilities. Pavement maintenance 
management systems promoted by the American 
Public Works Association (1987) enable managers 
to monitor road pavement conditions and sched- 
ule needed repairs. Carlson (1986) of the Fed- 
eral Highway Administration proposed a similar 
systematic maintenance review process for 
bridges. Implementation of such proposals, 
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state of Connecticut, for example, instituted a 
comprehensive bridge inspection and repair 
program that identified and ranked needed 
bridge reconstruction following the 1-95 tragedy. 
There is no obvious general groundswell of pub- 
lic opinion, however, for the reform of infrastruc- 
ture accounting procedures. 
Maintenance and 
Visibility 
Many aspects of the infrastructure problem, par- 
ticularly issues of maintenance and rehabilitation, 
have low levels of visibility and are not readily 
apparent to voters and elected officials. The costs 
of  neglected infrastructure accrue over time and 
are not immediately apparent or measurable. As 
discussed in Eberts (1988), often they occur in 
the form of lost productivity and slower regional 
growth. Even when observed, the long-run 
benefits of maintenance practices are potentially 
discounted by elected officials with short time 
horizons. Cohen and Noll (1984), for example, 
demonstrate that legislators maximizing the 
probability of reelection seek to defer such costs. 
Elected officials may also derive greater utility 
from new investment than from maintenance. 
Possible sources of utility from capital projects 
for public officials include political support and 
contributions from direct project beneficiaries. 
Weingast et al. (1981) present a model of legisla- 
tive behavior in which the geographic incidence 
of benefits and costs systematically biases public 
decisions toward larger-than-efficient projects. 
Capital projects give benefits directly to a small 
group, while their costs are widely distributed. 
Further political benefits come from being 
associated with large and visible investment proj- 
ects that do not accrue from the more mundane 
activities of maintenance. An assistant secretary 
for Housing and Urban Development asked, 
"Have you ever seen a politician presiding over a 
ribbon-cutting for an old sewer line that was 
repaired?" Such effects further encourage the 
substitution of investment for maintenance. 
Capital  Financing  Policies 
The political and budgetary bias against infra- 
structure maintenance is reinforced by two 
common features of capital financing: debt- 
8 4  Newsweek, August  2,  1982.  Also cited in Leonard (1986). 
financing of new capital and the traditional 
emphasis of federal grant policies on capital 
subsidies. 
Local governments often finance new pur- 
chases of capital, as well as major reconstruction 
and rehabilitation, through borrowing. Ordinary 
maintenance expenditures, however, are counted 
as operating expenses and are financed through 
current funds. This treatment of maintenance 
stems in part from the wide variance of mainte- 
nance activities. Certain maintenance activities, 
such as sweeping sidewalks or patching potholes, 
have immediate short-term benefits and, accord- 
ing to the benefit principle of public finance 
(those who benefit from public services should 
pay), should be paid for by the immediate bene- 
ficiaries through current revenues. The benefits 
of other maintenance activities, such as painting 
bridges or flushing sewers, accrue over many 
years. Maintenance of this sort constitutes a form 
of public investment that according to the 
benefit principle should be paid over many years 
through debt-financing.5 
Treating all maintenance activities as current 
expenses ineligible for debt-financing ignores 
their investment component and results in under- 
financing when operating budgets are tight. Dur- 
ing periods of budget constraints, officials choose 
between funding preventive maintenance at the 
expense of cutting back on other programs, or 
allowing infrastructure to deteriorate until major 
reconstruction is needed, which can be funded 
through debt. As the mayor of Lincoln, Nebraska 
observed, "In the choice between laying off 
police and maintaining sewers, the sewers 
always lose."6 
Federal grant policies for public infrastructure 
fxther exacerbate the bias against infrastructure 
maintenance. Under the rationale that local tax- 
payers should pay to operate the facilities pre- 
sented to them, federal grants often heavily sub- 
sidize new  construction, but provide no  assistance 
for maintenance or other operating expense. 
A wide range of federal grant programs pro- 
vide major assistance for infrastructure at the 
5  Maintenance is often considered in the operations research and 
investment literature to be a fixed operating expense. For a standard example, 
see the optimal equipment replacement model in Jorgenson et al. (1967) and 
the discussion in Nickell (1978). For  good reviews of  models of preventive 
maintenance, see Pierskall and Voelker (1976) and Sherif and Smith (1981). 
The  treatment of  maintenance as a form of investment is shown in Bitros 
(1976). This approach is used in models of  housing stock maintenance, in 
which maintenance expenditures have important effects on rental income and 
sale price. See Vorst (1987), Amott et al. (1983), and Sweeney (1974) for 
exam~les  of  such models. 
W  6  Newsweek,  op.  cit. 
http://clevelandfed.org/research/review/
1989 Q 2
Best available copystate and local level. In 1988, $25 billion in fed- 
eral grants accounted for 26 percent of state and 
local capital spending. This included $13.7 bil- 
lion granted by the Federal Highway Administra- 
tion (FHWA) for the construction and rehabilita- 
tion of highways; $2.6 billion from the 
Environmental Protection Agency for pollution 
control and abatement; $2.4 billion in capital 
financing for mass transit administered by the 
Urban Mass Transit Administration (UMTA); and 
$3.1 billion granted through the Community 
Development Block Grant program.' 
While the structure of grants varies from pro- 
gram to program, most provide capital assistance 
at a high matching rate, with the state and local 
government required to meet the matching 
share. The FWHA provides financing for comple- 
tion, rehabilitation, and reconstruction of the 
interstate highway system at a 90 percent match- 
ing rate. Discretionary grants from UMTA  for 
major rail and subway systems provide funds up 
to a 75 percent matching rate. Formula grants 
from UMTA  pay 80 percent of the cost of regular 
transit vehicle replacement. No corresponding 
subsidies, however, are provided for mainte- 
nance. These subsidies distort the relative prices 
facing local governments for new investment 
versus maintenance of existing infrastructure. 
Even if  the federal matching rate is not specified 
in formula, the expectation of federal aid poten- 
tially induces local officials to substitute away 
from maintenance. The empirical work we now 
turn to attempts to identify such substitution. 
II.  Local Mass Transit: 
A  Natural Experiment 
on  Subsidies 
and Infrastructure 
As  discussed in the previous section, several 
elements of public accounting, political and bud- 
get processes, and capital financing potentially 
lead to underfunding of infrastructure mainte- 
nance and result in excessive deterioration of 
public capital. Empirical research on the relative 
importance of these issues, however, has been 
limited by a dearth of data on capital assets and 
maintenance, and by a lack of obvious natural 
experiments with which to evaluate public-sector 
maintenance practices. In two recent studies, 
Cromwell(1988a) and Cromwell(1988b), how- 
7  See  U.S.  Office of  Management and Budget (1989). For  further discus- 
sion of  federal grants-in-aid, see Delmar and Menendez (1986). 
ever, I examine the impact of capital subsidies 
on investment and maintenance decisions of 
local governments, using data on the maintenance 
policies of both publicly and privately owned 
local mass-transit providers. While not address- 
ing all issues of infrastructure maintenance, these 
studies suggest that the structure of federal 
grants has significant effects on the infrastructure 
decisions of state and local governments. 
The data used were collected under the Sec- 
tion 15 Reporting System administered by the 
Urban Mass Transportation Administration 
(LJMTA). Section 15 data for fiscal year (FY) 1979 
through FYI985 are available for 435 transit sys- 
tems. The data set contains extensive informa- 
tion on vehicle fleets as well as expenditures 
and labor hours for vehicle maintenance, provid- 
ing a consistent measure of public capital and 
maintenance efforts not previously seen. These 
data provide an unusually detailed panel of local 
governments' physical assets. Vehicle inventories 
for each system are broken down by model, year 
of manufacture, and mileage. 
Data are also available for certain privately 
owned and operated systems. Their inclusion in 
the Section 15 data results from contracting with 
a public recipient of Section 9 funds to provide 
transit services. As these contracts often provide 
for the leasing of public vehicles, care was taken 
to examine maintenance and scrappage decisions 
only on vehicles owned outright by private 
operators. 
Federal Transit  Policies 
The federal government finances a major part of 
local public mass transportation. The principal 
federal grant program for entities that only oper- 
ate bus lines (the focus of these studies) is the 
Section 9 formula grant program that distributes 
funds to urbanized areas for use in transit operat- 
ing and capital expenditures. The Section 9 capi- 
tal funds are principally used for vehicle replace- 
ment and pay up to  80 percent of the cost of a 
new vehicle. As funds are adequate for normal 
vehicle replacement, this matching rate represents 
an enormous marginal subsidy for new capital. 
Vehicle maintenance, however, is counted as 
an operating expense and is ineligible for the 
capital subsidy. Due to a desire by UMTA  to 
wean local entities away from operating assis- 
tance, the Surface Transportation Act of 1982 
capped the level of funds available for operating 
assistance for FYI983 and beyond to some 90 
percent of the FYI982 level, or to 50 percent of a 
property's operating deficit, whichever was 
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lower. The overwhelming majority of public- 
transit properties are constrained by the cap and 
receive no operating assistance on the margin. 
Federal control over maintenance principally 
consists of setting an upper limit for deteriora- 
tion of federally purchased equipment. UMTA 
requires local transit properties to operate buses 
purchased with federal funds for at least 12 years 
or 500,000 miles.* Failure to do so results in a 
penalty in federal assistance for new capital pur- 
chases. This 12-year limit, however, is below the 
potential operating life of 15 to 20 years for 
standard bus models when properly maintained. 
The structure of the UMTA grants results in a 
large distortion in the relative price of  mainte- 
nance versus new investment for buses over 12 
years old. If  the capital and maintenance deci- 
sions of  local government are sensitive to the 
structure of subsidies, we would expect the fol- 
lowing results. First, publicly owned buses 
should depreciate quickly, with little physical or 
financial value left after 12 years. Second, we 
would expect higher average levels of  mainte- 
nance in the private sector compared to the pub- 
lic sector. Finally, in the public sector we would 
expect low levels of scrappage before the 13- 
year point, a marked shift in scrappage at year 
13, then high levels of scrappage thereafter. A 
similar pattern for privately owned vehicles is 
unlikely, as they are not subject to such a discon- 
tinuity in the price of new equipment9 
8  See UMTA (June 1985) 
Evidence from used-bus prices supports the thesis 
that public equipment depreciates rapidly. The 
used-bus market is highly fragmented and ad hoc 
in nature. The disposition of equipment is not re- 
ported in the Section 15 data, and no central data 
source of  used-bus prices or sales exists. UMTA 
officials report, however, that the used transit bus 
market is depressed. The supply of public vehi- 
cles over 12 years old far exceeds demand-and 
vehicles are most commonly sold for scrap. 
Depressed prices, however, are also consistent 
with systematic undermaintenance  of equipment. 
To confirm this, I collected transaction prices 
for some 645 transit vehicles sold in 1987 and 
1988 by contacting all properties that solicited 
bids for used vehicles during this period.10 The 
results of this survey are shown in table 1. Prices 
for publicly owned vehicles manufactured 
before 1971 ranged from $100 to $3,500,  with an 
9  Previous studies on transit subsidies have used detailed engineering 
data from specific transit systems to simulate the effects of capital bias in the 
subsidy structure on scrappage dates. Tye (1969) used data from the Cleve- 
land and Chicago transit systems to simulate the effect of subsidies in the late 
1960s that paid for new capital at a 66.6 percent rate, but which provided no 
assistance for operating expenses. He calculated that the subsidy would lead 
a cost-minimizing  transit firm to replace buses at half the efficient age. For 
average levels of utilization, this implied scrappage at 8 to 10 years versus an 
efficient 17 to 20 years, with the resulting waste of  resources equaling 27 per- 
cent of  the subsidy. Similarly, Armour (1980) used data from Seattle Metro 
and calculated that the 80 percent federal capital subsidy reduced the optimal 
scrappage point from 20.5  to 26 years to 8.5  to 10 years. 
Frankena (1987) is the paper closest in spirit to the empirical work pre- 
sented here. Using probit estimation with 1961 to 1983 data on scrappage of 
Canadian buses, this study shows that scrappage increases with age, and that 
significantly higher average scrappage rates followed the imposition of  a 
capital-biased subsidy program in 1972. He finds no  significant change, how- 
ever, in the scrappage rate when the capital subsidies take effect at age 15 
(the critical point in the Canadian subsidy program). In general, the hazard- 
model estimators used here dominate the probit approach. They allow for vari- 
ation in the underlying hazard rate over time, and control for bias introduced by 
vehicles dropping out of the sample when scrapped. The results, as will be 
seen, show a significant impact on scrappage when subsidies take effect. 
10  Used-bus prices were obtained by contacting all agencies soliciting 
bids in Passenger Transport between January 1987 and June 1988. Typically, 
less than 10 bids were received per auction with a mean of five bids reported 
by properties that would provide this information. Those bidding included 
Caribbean nations, church groups, charter-bus operators, people planning to 
rrake recreational vehicles, and farmers in need of storage space. If the vehi- 
cles were purchased with federal funds, UMTA collected 80 percent of  the 
proceeds with an  allowance made for administrative expenses. The costs of 
soliciting bids or holding an auction, however, often were reported to exceed 
the remaining local share. 
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Expenses per  0.77  0.53 
mile ($1.00)  (0.12)  (0.02) 
labor hours  37.8  29.3 
per 1,000 miles  (3.6)  (1.4) 
Percent of fleet 
>  12 years old 
Percent mileage on  26.7  11.2 
vehicles >  12 years old 
Number of observations  22  100 
a. 1984 cross-section sample means (standard errors). 
SOURCE: Author's calculations. 
average price of $5  1  1. Even vehicles reported to 
be well-maintained typically did not sell for over 
$3,000. Prices for vehicles manufactured between 
1971 and 1975 ranged from $250 for scrapped 
vehicles to $6,000 for well-maintained vehicles. 
Prices for newer vehicles manufactured between 
1976 and 1980 averaged $8,863. 
I was also able to obtain used-vehicle prices 
for a much smaller sample of privately owned 
vehicles. These prices, also shown in table 1, 
suggest that the private vehicles are in better 
condition and command a higher price, with 
prices averaging from $3,500 to $7,500 for vehi- 
cles manufactured before 1976. Other private 
companies, however, reported selling their vehi- 
cles for scrap at the depressed prices similar to 
those received by public agencies. 
The extremely low prices on used buses sug- 
gest that maintenance practices can lead to rapid 
deterioration of equipment in the public sector. It 
is important, however, to distinguish between 
variations in maintenance and depreciation attrib- 
utable to unavoidable operating conditions, and 
variations due to capital grant policies or bureau- 
cratic behavior that are potential sources of gov- 
ernment inefficiency.  The empirical work that fol- 
lows attempts to identify these separate effects. 
Evidence on  Maintenance 
The impact of the capital grant structure on aver- 
age levels of maintenance is examined in 
Cromwell (1988a). My  initial empirical work 
examines a cross-section of Section 15 data for 
FYI984 from 122 transit properties. The sample 
consists of single-mode bus operators- 
properties that provide only fixed-route bus ser- 
vice as opposed to rail or demand-response 
service-that operated at least five revenue vehi- 
cles. Table 2 reports sample means for mainte- 
nance expenses and maintenance employees, 
scaled by annual vehicle miles. In general, the 
average levels of both expenses and labor hours 
follow the predicted patterns. The private sys- 
tems, on average, spend 45 percent more on 
maintenance per mile and devote 29 percent 
more labor hours to maintenance than do the 
public systems. 
The average age of vehicles in private systems 
is substantially higher than that for public fleets, 
with 38.4 percent of the private fleets being 
more than 12 years old compared to 22.0 percent 
of the public fleets. The distribution of vehicles 
weighted by miles is similar, with 26.7 and 11.2 
percent of the mileage being run on vehicles 
older than 12 years for the private and public 
systems, respectively. The older fleet in the pri- 
vate systems is consistent with privately owned 
capital deteriorating slower than publicly owned 
capital as a result of greater maintenance efforts. 
The means shown in table 2, while consistent 
with the predicted results regarding the private 
versus public operators, do not control for sys- 
tematic differences due to  wages,  operating condi- 
tions, and fleet composition. For example, many 
of the private systems operate in the New York 
metropolitan area, which is noted for its harsh 
operating conditions. To examine the public/ 
private differential more systematically, I use 
pooled time-series cross-section regression anal- 
ysis on  a sample of systems between 1982 and 
1985. Independent variables  include maintenance 
wage rates, operating conditions, fleet composi- 
tion, fleet age, and a dummy variable for opera- 
tion in the New York area. The results show that, 
controlling for wages, operating conditions, and 
fleet composition, privately owned transit com- 
panies devote some 14 to 17 percent more labor 
hours to maintenance than do publicly owned 
and managed transit companies. The analysis then 
uses this public/private differential,  along with 
cross-state variation in grant policies, to measure 
the elasticity of maintenance with respect to cap- 
ital subsidies. The point estimates suggest an 
elasticity of -0.16, meaning that a 10 percent 
increase in the subsidy rate for transit capital 
reduces vehicle maintenance by 1.6 percent. 
The estimates are statistically significant and 
suggest that average maintenance levels are 
higher in the private sector. They do not neces- 
sarily demonstrate, however, that public capital 
deteriorates at a faster rate than privately owned 
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Vehicle Age (years) 
SOURCE:  Author's calculations. 
Percent 
Vehicle Age (years) 
SOURCE:  Author's calculations. - 
capital. The higher levels of maintenance labor 
hours could be attributed to less capital-intensive 
maintenance practices. Furthermore, an implicit 
assumption that maintenance is qualitatively sim- 
ilar between the two sectors could be false. If 
one sector fixes equipment upon failure, as 
opposed to conducting preventive maintenance, 
differences in overall maintenance levels could 
result. The companion analysis in Cromwell 
(1988b), however, directly examines the scrap- 
page and retirement rates of private versus pub- 
lic equipment to determine whether the higher 
maintenance in the private sector is reflected in 
longer equipment life. 
Evidence on Scrappage 
Cromwell(1988b) examines the impact of sub- 
sidies on equipment life by tracking vehicles in 
the UMTA data set from 1982 through 1985. 
Scrappage decisions were observed for 15,829 
vehicles, including 1,005 privately owned vehi- 
cles from 11 privately owned companies. Vehi- 
cles that changed from active to inactive status or 
that were dropped from the fleets between report 
years were counted as scrapped. The results pro- 
vide strong evidence that federal grant policies 
have a direct impact on local scrappage decisions. 
The probability of scrappage for public and 
private vehicles of different ages (or empirical 
hazard) can be estimated directly from the 
observed scrappage rates and is plotted, with 95 
percent confidence intervals, in figures 1 and 2." 
The estimates in general suggest the importance 
of federal grant policies for public-sector scrap- 
page. The hazard for public vehicles averages 
under 4 percent for years prior to age 13, then 
jumps to over 11 percent at age 13, decreases 
slightly at age 14, then rises steadily to 37 per- 
cent by age 19. Standard errors calculated for 
these estimates suggest that the hazards for pub- 
lic vehicles are measured with much precision 
and that the shift at the 13-year point is statisti- 
cally significant. 
11  The empirical scrappage rate presented here is also known as the 
Kaplan-Meier (1958) hazard estimator, which directly estimates the hazard 
function tom  the sample of vehicles. For  each time 1,  the number of failures 
D(t) (that is,  the number of vehicles scrapped) is divided by the total number 
of vehicles at risk at  the start of time t, R(t).  Censored spells (that is, vehicles 
that are not observed to be scrapped) are included in the risk set previous to 
their censor time and are dropped thereafter. This treatment of censoring 
yields a consistent estimate of the true hazard at each time t as long as the 
censoring mechanism and vehicle age are independent of each other. The 




Best available copyThe private-vehicle hazards are estimated with 
less precision and exhibit more volatility, but in 
general show a rise in scrappage from near 0 for 
the 1- to 6-year period to an average 5 percent 
for the 7- to 10-year period to 9 percent at the 
Percent  13-year point. Due to only one scrappage out of 
30  143 in the age-12 risk set, however, the esti- 
mated hazard at year 12 is quite low, and a shift 
appears to occur at the 13-year point-contrary  - 
to the predicted pattern. This shift can be attrib- 
uted, however, to the smallness of the sample 
20 -  size and, given the estimated hazards in the sur- 
rounding years, the pattern of estimated hazards 
for private vehicles appears to be markedly dif-  - 
ferent from the public sector. 
These empirical hazard rates do not account 
10 -  for heterogeneity across transit systems in prices 
of maintenance and operating conditions. Given 
the large number of private vehicles operating in  -  the New York metropolitan area, for example, 
adverse operating conditions might have a major 
impact on observed private-sector  scrappage. To 
0  5  10  15  20  account for this heterogeneity, I employed a haz- 
Vehicle Age (years)  ard estimator that allows for nonparametric esti- 
mation of the baseline scrappage rate, while per- 
SOURCE:  Author's calculations.  mitting estimation of the impact of operating 
I  conditions, wage rates, and other explanatory var- 
iables.12 The resulting baseline hazards  are shown 
in figure 3. The impact of the grant structure on 
public-sector scrappage is readily apparent. 
While the private-sector baseline remains under 
Percent 
5 percent until year 16, and then rises steadily 
through year 20, the public-sector baseline takes 
a distinct and significant jump at the 13-year 
point from 1 percent to over 8 percent, twice 
that of the private sector. Scrappage then rises to 
over 14 percent for 15- and 16-year-old vehicles 
and remains above the private sector until year 
19. The distinct difference in scrappage rates can 
be attributed to the availability of federal grants. 
An alternative approach to examining public 
and private scrappage is to look at the survivor 
functions for the two sectors. The survivor func- 
tion is defined as the percentage of vehicles of a 
given vintage that survive to a given age, as 
shown in figure 4. The functions further empha- 
size the difference between public and private 
ot----'----'--..'----'  . 
5  10  15  20 
12  The  baseline hazard estimates shown here are estimated using the 
semiparametric hazard estimator shown in Meyer (1988)  and first developed in 
Vehicle Age  (years)  Prenlice and Gloeckler (1978). This estimator allows for control of  explanatory 
variables without imposing a specific structural form on the underlying baseline 
SOURCE:  Author's calculations.  hazard. Cromwell (1988b) also presents estimates using the fully parametric 
estimator which imposes the commonly used Weibull baseline as shown in  -  Lancaster (1979) and Katz (1986). 
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year 12, then diverge as public scrappage sharply 
increases. Again, this shift in the survivor func- 
tion at the 13-year point can be attributed to the 
sudden availability of federal subsidies. By age 
16, only 47 percent of the public vehicles sur- 
vive, compared to 73 percent for private vehicles. 
At age 20,45 percent of private vehicles are still 
estimated to be in operation, versus 20 percent 
for the public sector. 
The consistently lower survival rate of publicly 
owned vehicles after the availability of federal 
funds is direct evidence that federal capital 
grants reduce equipment life in the local public 
sector. It suggests that federal grant policies that 
subsidize the purchase of new capital, but that 
ignore the maintenance of existing capital, result 
in the increased deterioration of public infra- 
structure. The magnitude of savings for the tran- 
sit industry from a shift in policies, however, may 
be small if  increased maintenance expenses 
offset reduced vehicle ex enditures. In a simula- 
tion of vehicle replacement  9  eported in Crom- 
well (1988b), this is the case. In spite of 
increased deterioration of public capital, the net 
efficiency losses of the federal subsidies appear 
to be low. There may be unobserved costs, how- 
ever, in terms of quality of service that result 
from lower maintenance levels and increased 
deterioration of equipment. 
IV.  Conclusion 
Several aspects of public accounting, political 
and budgetary procedures, and capital financing 
potentially lead local governments to systemati- 
cally underfund the maintenance of public infra- 
structure. The resulting excessive deterioration 
of public capital has been advanced as a possible 
source of the "infrastructure crisis" of recent 
years. 
This article summarizes the results of two stud- 
ies of one aspect of infrastructure maintenance: 
the impact of large federal capital subsidies for 
new investment with no corresponding subsi- 
dies for maintenance. Using data from the local 
mass-transit industries, the empirical results sug- 
gest federal subsidies for new transit vehicles 
lower maintenance levels and increase scrap- 
page rates in public transit systems. The 
extremely low resale value of used vehicles 
further suggests excessive deterioration. In the 
case of local mass transit, however, the net cost 
of the distortion appears to be small. The results 
suggest that increased purchases of vehicles are 
offset by lower maintenance costs. 
While the efficiency losses of the transit subsi- 
dies for new vehicles appear to be small, they 
still show that local governments respond signifi- 
cantly to incentives in the price of maintenance 
versus new investment introduced by federal 
subsidies. Given the several other biases against 
infrastructure maintenance discussed in section 
I, this suggests that federal policies should focus 
more on the maintenance and upkeep of facili- 
ties purchased with federal funds. Possible pro- 
posals to support maintenance include reducing 
the distortion in the relative price of mainte- 
nance versus new investment facing local author- 
ities through direct federal subsidies of impor- 
tant maintenance activities or through a 
reduction in the federal subsidy rate for capital 
projects. Adoption of preventive maintenance 
programs developed by public works experts 
could also be a requirement of receiving federal 
aid. Leonard suggests the development of a 
maintenance schedule at the time of acquisition 
of a new capital facility. The financial require- 
ments for maintenance would be a formal liabil- 
ity recorded on a jurisdiction's financial state- 
ment. Reforms in this direction would help 
ensure that existing capital is betterpreserved 
and that large projected investments in new 
infrastructure are not wasted. 
Finally, future research in this area could 
include analysis on how the incentive effects 
described here for the local mass-transit industry 
apply to other forms of infrastructure. Using the 
standard optimal equipment replacement model 
in Cromwell (1988b), one would expect that the 
elasticity of optimal equipment life with respect 
to capital subsidies is larger for capital goods 
with shorter useful equipment lives, and larger 
for capital goods whose acquisition costs are 
large relative to maintenance costs. It would be 
interesting to examine the difference in magni- 
tude of the distorting effects of federal subsidies 
for infrastructure with these characteristics. 
Furthermore, the distorting effects of capital 
subsidies are likely to be more severe when the 
deterioration of infrastructure is less visible-as 
in the case of sewers, water mains, or the under- 
sides of bridges. Less visibility reduces the ability 
of voters or federal bureaucrats to monitor the 
condition of local infrastructure.  Such monitor- 
ing potentially acts as a check on the incentives 
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